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The Three Faces of Bounded Reliability: Alfred Chandler and the Micro-Foundations of 
Management Theory 
ABSTRACT 
Alfred Chandler, the celebrated business historian, provided detailed descriptions of both the 
reasons for failed human commitments and the managerial tools to prevent/remediate such 
failings, in the context of a growing business firms.  Chandler’s historical narrative allows 
identifying three distinct ‘faces’ of bounded reliability (BRel), including conventional 
opportunism, as the main drivers of commitment failure.  It also suggests a corresponding, 
‘Cerberus-type’ approach to managerial action.  Adopting BRel as a micro-foundation in 
management studies will raise the quality and relevance of scholarly recommendations to 
improve managerial decision-making and action, because analysis of BRel challenges closely 
mirrors the real-world problems facing practicing managers. 
INTRODUCTION 
Realistic behavioural assumptions or micro-foundations play a pivotal role in any theory that 
claims managerial relevance. As Simon famously pointed out, “nothing is more fundamental in 
setting our research agenda… than our view of the nature of the human beings, whose behaviour 
we are studying. It makes a difference, a very large difference, to our research strategy.”1 Micro-
foundations are thus important for theory building and testing, but they are also critical for 
guiding managerial practice. Here, adopting realistic behavioural assumptions can guide 
managers to make better decisions and to engage in better implementation of a planned sequence 
of actions, thereby achieving better outcomes. 
Much management research draws upon two core assumptions about the behaviour of 
economic actors – bounded rationality and some strong form of self-interest.2  In particular, 
economics-based management theories such as transaction cost economics (TCE) assume self-
 2 
interest akin to opportunism, a concept popularized by Oliver Williamson, TCE’s main advocate 
and one of the theory’s two intellectual fathers (the other one being the late Ronald Coase).3 
Opportunism can be defined as “self-interest seeking with guile” or “calculated efforts to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse.”4  If opportunism is adopted as a micro-
foundation, then purposive managerial decision-making and action should be guided by the need 
to safeguard against economic actors’ potential opportunistic behaviour.   
While Williamson has been called “the most sophisticated student of opportunism”, and 
TCE has been characterized as an “opportunism-based” theory,5 variations of this micro-
foundation have been adopted and explored far beyond Williamson’s original application in the 
context of structural governance choices, such as the choice between arm’s length contracting 
and internalization.  Opportunism as a variable or assumed micro-foundation appears in a wide 
range of studies in multiple management sub-disciplines and functional settings, from marketing, 
entrepreneurship, organizational dynamics, operations, and international business, to ethics, law 
and public policy.
6
 The context in which opportunism is invoked has broadened from the well-
understood Williamsonian puzzle of selecting the best available governance structure, to a wide 
range of applications, including the dynamics of ongoing relationships among a variety of actors 
engaged in economic exchanges, such as business partners, family members, employees, 
contractors, competitors, and government agencies.
7
 
Yet, the relevance of the opportunism assumption has been much debated.
8
  Opportunism 
has been criticised for its narrow conceptual focus, for having earned only scarce and 
inconclusive empirical support, and, broadly speaking, for its inaccurate portrayal of human 
nature.
9
  It has been argued that the assumption of unbounded self-interest is as unrealistic as the 
neoclassical assumption of unbounded rationality, rejected by management scholars in favour of 
the bounded rationality construct.
10
 Most importantly, it has been argued that propagating 
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opportunism as the essential micro-foundation to guide managerial decision-making and action 
actually creates ‘bad’ management practices and – paradoxically – destroys the moral fibre of 
business.
11
 Scholarly attempts to uncover ways of curbing opportunism, either ex ante or ex post, 
have yielded a rather limited toolbox of mechanisms, consisting mainly of contractual safeguards, 
incentive alignment, monitoring and – perhaps paradoxically – the development of ‘trust.’12 The 
problem with this toolbox is that it still leaves firms vulnerable to commitment breakdowns due 
to behavioural drivers other than opportunism. 
We view the envelope-concept of bounded reliability (BRel), first introduced by Rugman 
and Verbeke, as a more appropriate micro-foundation for studying the behaviour of economic 
actors.
13
 BRel refers to economic actors being reliable, but only boundedly so (similar to bounded 
rationality referring to economic actors being rational, but only boundedly so). BRel can be 
defined as imperfect effort to make good on open-ended commitments, either because of 
opportunism or because of two other reasons.  First, benevolent preference reversal, which often 
occurs in a systemic fashion, with the same individuals engaging in repeated, dysfunctional 
preference reversals (thereby suggesting that the challenge at hand encompasses more than a 
mere information problem), but without guile playing a significant role.
14
  Second, identity-based 
discordance, which means that in spite of individuals’ stated or assumed commitments, they 
maintain contradictory behaviour in line with their personal identity or with past, prevailing 
practices they identify with. 
The BRel concept is relevant especially when addressing the micro-level detail of 
decision-making and action in the form of managerial practices or routines, deployed within a 
broader governance system that guides relationships among economic actors inside the firm and 
with outside stakeholders, such as suppliers, distributors, other types of contracting partners, and 
organizations in the non-market sphere.
15
 BRel can be used to assess the relative efficiency and 
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effectiveness of these managerial practices, whereas opportunism, being a more limiting micro-
foundation with a narrow toolbox to prevent its occurrence or to mitigate its negative 
consequences, would fail to address any ‘good faith’ commitment failures.   
The first objective of this article is to develop the BRel concept further, by exploring 
behavioural elements, in addition to – or as a substitute for – opportunism.  BRel provides a 
comprehensive framework for the treatment of failed commitments, but it is a relatively new, 
multifaceted concept requiring further conceptual development and refinement. BRel has been 
invoked in several studies in international business and entrepreneurship, and now requires 
further contextualization in the more general areas of strategy and general management.
16
  
Given the above, this article’s second objective is to investigate more thoroughly the 
multiple facets of BRel in a very specific managerial setting. Here, we will focus on insights from 
the oeuvre of Alfred Chandler, the late business historian. Specifically, we revisit Chandler’s 
classic history of the Du Pont and General Motors Company (GM) corporations.
17
 Our choice of 
this historical context was targeted.  Alfred Chandler has been called “the most influential 
business historian of the twentieth century” and has been lauded for “almost inventing the field of 
strategic management.”18 His monumental works, Strategy and Structure, Pierre S. Du Pont and 
the Making of the Modern Corporation, The Visible Hand and Scale and Scope, have become 
foundational pieces of modern management thinking.
19
 Importantly, for the purpose of our study, 
Chandler’s work served as one of the original sources for TCE theory development in the context 
of large-firm governance, with opportunism as one of the theory’s two micro-foundations (the 
other one being the widely accepted bounded rationality concept).   
It has been argued that history can help management scholars and practitioners understand 
the nature and context of contemporary problems, forecast trends, refine knowledge, and interpret 
the present.
20
 In this study, we draw a lesson from history by examining Chandler’s narrative on 
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the ‘making of the modern corporation’, i.e. the transformation of the Du Pont Corporation and 
GM from loosely run family businesses to modern industrial corporations. We try to understand 
better the managerial implications of this classic work of business history, using BRel as a novel 
management theory lens.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  First, we include a brief background 
on the scholarly discussion surrounding appropriate micro-foundational assumptions of 
management theory, with a focus on BRel as the envelope of behavioural drivers to explain failed 
managerial commitments. Second, we provide further discussion of our data source and give an 
overview of our methodology. Third, building upon Chandler’s historical analysis, we present a 
comprehensive model of BRel, whereby we distinguish between opportunism and two other faces 
of BRel. We show how all three BRel faces – as well as the managerial tools to manage them – 
are relevant to explaining the ‘making of the modern corporation’. We conclude with discussing 
the implications of the multiple dimensions of the BRel concept as an appropriate micro-
foundation for management research associated with an extensive toolbox for managers. 
MICROFOUNDATIONS OF MANAGEMENT THEORY: OPPORTUNISM VERSUS 
BOUNDED RELIABILITY 
Given the above-mentioned questions surrounding the accuracy, completeness and even 
relevance of the behavioural assumption of opportunism, social scientists have engaged in 
exploring a variety of alternatives.  Yet, in spite of a surge in the study of multiple expressions of 
bounded rationality (including, inter alia, the rich work on prospect theory),
21
 no alternative to – 
or extension of – opportunism has made credible inroads into the management literature. In their 
pioneering article on a behavioural approach to law and economics, Jolls et al. introduced 
bounded willpower and bounded self-interest as complements to the assumption of bounded 
rationality, but these constructs do not capture in a comprehensive fashion non-fulfillment of 
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commitments in an organizational setting, nor have management scholars adopted them as 
alternatives to opportunism.
22
  
Trust has been put forward as an alternative assumption to explain and guide managerial 
decision-making and action in particular situational contexts, but we do not view trust as a proper 
micro-foundation for management studies. Williamson himself has always viewed trust as a non-
starter: the view that individuals should be considered inherently trustworthy or that the 
engineering of trust in organizational settings can achieve this same outcome (as in: ‘trust me that 
I will make good on my commitments’), is considered naïve or myopic in the absence of other 
safeguards and unnecessary in the presence of such safeguards.
23
  Further, there is no clear, 
unambiguous relationship between higher trust and the level of achieving desired outcomes of an 
exchange. On the contrary, higher trust unaccompanied by credible safeguards implies higher 
vulnerability of at least one party to the exchange, and therefore unwanted exposure to the dark 
side of trust.
24
 In addition, even in a fully trusting environment, and without any strong form of 
self-interest, there can be an abundance of failed commitments.  
We view BRel as one of the most significant extensions of credible micro-foundations for 
management theory, beyond refinements to the bounded rationality concept. As noted above, 
BRel explains non-fulfillment of commitments even in the absence of intentional deceit (but 
beyond the mere lack of technical competences or the dominance of unpredictable and 
uncontrollable environmental changes). Bounds on reliability can take the form of opportunism, 
but also – and more commonly – of benevolent preference reversal and identity-based 
discordance vis-à-vis agreed upon goals, courses of action, and allocation of resources to 
achieving these goals
25
.  
Understanding good-faith sources of commitment failure can assist in designing 
appropriate mechanisms to prevent or correct such failures without invoking value-laden and 
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often inaccurate concepts such as breach of trust (betrayal) or dishonest behaviour (cheating). In 
terms of managerial practices described in extant literature, the mechanisms to prevent or correct 
expressions of BRel are significantly broader than those employed to curb opportunism, and can 
include realistic formal goal-setting, regular reviews of targets, cultivating informal connections 
among actors working on interrelated activities, developing clear roadmaps to implement projects, 
joint planning by different hierarchical levels in the organization, frequent budgetary reviews and 
setting limits on the size and scope of new activities.
26
   
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Historical case study: Pierre Du Pont, Chandler and Williamson 
Pierre S. Du Pont and the Making of the Modern Corporation is a well-known, detailed account 
of the functioning of various parts of the Du Pont and GM corporations, written from the point of 
view of Pierre Du Pont, a critical force behind both corporations’ unprecedented growth and 
success and arguably America’s “single most influential executive.”27 Chandler’s historical study 
covers almost 130 years, from the time Pierre Du Pont’s great-great-grandfather founded the Du 
Pont Company in 1799, until the end of Pierre’s active business career, marked by his resignation 
from GM’s board in 1928.  Chandler himself referred to his book as “the story of a man rather 
than of a firm,” arguing that “a study of a businessman rather than a business firm has the 
advantage of permitting a sharp focus. It makes possible an exploration and an analysis of 
complex business activities, processes and decisions in a shorter space…”28 Pierre was involved 
in the Du Pont Corporation, his family’s business, from the early 1900s, first as a treasurer, and 
eventually as the company’s President. At GM, Pierre entered the scene at a time of crisis, and 
helped reverse the company’s fortune through his leadership as an influential shareholder, Board 
member, President and Chairman. While the circumstances of Pierre’s involvement in the two 
corporations are different, the relevant commonality is that under his guidance, both companies 
 8 
were transformed into professionally managed, technologically advanced corporations, and, 
importantly, the largest and most powerful international competitors in their respective industries. 
We chose this particular book among Chandler’s writings for three reasons. First, the 
focus on one individual’s exchanges with a wide variety of economic actors provides an 
appropriate setting for exploring realistic micro-foundations of management theory. 
Second, Pierre S. Du Pont and the Making of the Modern Corporation is the least known 
but the most personal of Chandler’s four masterpieces. Strategy and Structure, The Visible Hand, 
and Scale and Scope have been widely celebrated and analyzed,
29
 while Pierre S. Du Pont and 
the Making of the Modern Corporation garnered significantly less scholarly and public attention.  
However, Chandler’s family was tightly intertwined with the Du Pont family and the Du Pont 
Corporation for decades. Chandler’s great grandmother was raised by the Du Ponts after the 
death of her parents, and his great grandfather was William G. Ramsay – the first chief engineer 
of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Chemical Company, prominently featured in the book. This 
personal connection makes Chandler’s story particularly compelling in terms of the depth of 
insight embedded in the analysis.   
Third, Chandler’s work, as mentioned above, inspired Williamson’s comparative analysis 
of functionally organized  (unitary or U-form) and multi-divisional (M-form) companies in terms 
of their fit with particular external environments and internal strategic requirements.  
Williamson’s interpretation of Chandler’s oeuvre is that the M-form, as a governance mechanism 
with bounded-rationality-economizing properties, also supported curbing opportunism in multi-
product, multi-market strategy settings. The M-form attenuates sub-goal pursuit by functional 
departments, prevailing in the U-form enterprise.
30
 In the present paper, our interest is not to 
revisit the comparative efficiency of the two governance structures in specific situational contexts, 
but rather to assess whether Chandler himself assumed a strong form of self-interest. Chandler 
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did not explicitly embrace any particular behavioural assumption, which is consistent with the 
general tendency of most historical records to omit motivations.
31
 In fact, Chandler was 
concerned mainly with accurately describing organizational change processes, rather than with 
crafting a parsimonious conceptual explanation of such organizational change, a point also 
powerfully made by Jones and Khanna on the importance of Chandler’s oeuvre for the 
management field.
32
 Williamson’s interpretation of Chandler’s work, with the need to curb 
opportunism as a critical driver of organizational transformation, would therefore appear to be 
somewhat overly parsimonious, an often-observed hazard when the work of a business historian 
is used by social scientists.
33
  
Not surprisingly, our analysis of Chandler’s work suggests he espoused a much broader 
view of human nature than opportunism, more closely aligned with the BRel perspective. During 
their transition from family businesses to professionally managed, diversified enterprises, firms 
such as Du Pont and GM were bound to encounter many challenges that had a human dimension: 
conflicts between personal and impersonal values, business’ intrusion on kinship, a need to cope 
with changes in previously successful managerial practices, a requirement to build capacity to 
process new information and to absorb new ways of doing business, are but a few problems 
encountered by employees and managers of Du Pont and GM in their journey toward 
professionally managed, diversified corporations.  Many of these problems are related to bounded 
rationality, and some indeed to opportunism, which triggered failed commitments. However, as 
we will show below, malevolence is insufficient as a generalized explanation of such failures. 
Chandler de facto described other important behavioural drivers of failure.  
 It should be noted that Chandler himself suggested that his case study descriptions could 
be used as a basis for management theorizing.
34
 Our specific focus is on the divergence between a 
narrow, opportunism-based interpretation of the functioning of large, diversified firms, and what 
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we consider Chandler’s own interpretation. We therefore do not make claims about objective 
reality, but rather, in accordance with a more subjectivist worldview appropriate for inductive 
research, about Chandler’s interpretation of reality. We recognize that Chandler had a rather 
personal story to tell. This story, however, is informed by the business historian’s focus on the 
micro-level detail of managerial practice, and it allowed us to identify the context and reasons for 
several instances of broken promises. It provided insight, from Chandler’s perspective, into 
which micro-foundations composing the ‘nature of man’ affect managerial practices and 
outcomes.  
Theory building 
We followed a five-task sequence for theory building through historical analysis.
35
 The first task 
is case selection, discussed in detail above. The second task is constructing, whereby we adopted 
the prior conceptualization of BRel by Verbeke and his co-authors as a starting point, to develop 
a broad, multifaceted concept with high explanatory power. The third task includes collecting and 
appraising source material, referring in this case to our initial reading of the text to ensure 
sufficient level of detail to enable our analysis. The fourth task is engaging iteratively in analysis 
and narrative. Here, we adopted elements of the grounded theory approach, but deviated from 
pure-play inductive research to a form of ‘abductive’ inquiry, meaning that data and extant theory 
were considered simultaneously.
36
 Specifically, we searched for patterns in the behaviour of 
economic actors that explained failed commitments.  
Using emergent coding, we looked for distinct dimensions of BRel in terms of patterns of 
managerial behaviour explaining non-fulfillment of commitments. We grouped each set of 
related examples into an emerging dimension of BRel, and further categorized related examples 
into distinct overarching faces of BRel, thereby identifying three faces, each having two 
dimensions: opportunism (consisting of ex-ante and ex-post opportunism), benevolent preference 
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reversal (consisting of reprioritization and scaling back on overcommitment), and identity-based 
discordance (consisting of regression and divided engagement).
37
 The three-faced model of BRel 
is shown in Figure 1. 
We used a special sub-category of content related to safeguarding against the three faces 
and six dimensions of BRel, i.e. instances of managerial behaviour directed at preventing or 
mitigating each type of commitment non-fulfilment. We coded such instances of safeguarding 
and conducted a comparison across categories to identify differences and similarities in 
safeguarding practices tied to each specific BRel dimension, as shown in Table 1.    
The fifth and last task in theory building is results evaluation. Here, we created our broad 
model of BRel consisting of the three faces and six dimensions, with distinct safeguarding 
mechanisms and behaviour drivers associated with each. We then applied our framework to the 
entirety of Chandler’s text to confirm that our conceptualization fits plausibly with his story.  
Finally, we told our own story of how the three faces of BRel fit together, how they fit with 
Chandler’s description of the making of the modern corporation, and, most importantly, how they 
remediate the limiting opportunism assumption.   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As noted above, our analysis revealed three main behavioural patterns related to failed human 
commitments. In this section, we describe concrete examples of these three faces in Chandler’s 
work, in line with Figure 1.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Opportunism 
Predictably, incidents of both ex-ante and ex-post opportunism were found in Chandler’s 
historical account.   
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Ex-ante opportunism. A notorious antitrust lawsuit against Du Pont, instigated by a former 
employee, offers an example of ex-ante opportunism.
38
 Robert Waddell, a former Dupont 
salesman, had resigned from the company to start his own operations.  Having gained 
independence from Du Pont –with the latter expecting ‘fair’ competitive behavior typical for 
industry rivals – Waddell launched a crusade against Du Pont, fully guided by self-interest 
seeking with guile. He accused the firm of monopolizing the market and using unfair competitive 
tactics to drive smaller players out of business. Wadell’s motivations from the outset were to win 
a personal vendetta against Du Pont and to collect damages should his own company be ‘proven’ 
a victim of unfair competition. Waddell’s attack relied on a multitude of distorted facts and false 
premises (e.g., stating that Du Pont was selling at a loss for the purpose of destroying competitors; 
deliberately and falsely portraying Senator Henry A. du Pont as Du Pont Company’s head to 
create negative publicity; accusing Du Pont of a plan to extort the government, etc.). It serves as 
an example of premeditated, ex-ante opportunism by an economic actor whose only relationship 
with Du Pont at the time of the lawsuit was that of being a competitor, and whose main goal was 
to extract money from Du Pont, through the use of the court system. 
Ex-post opportunism. As one example, during the economic downturn of 1907, Du Pont’s long-
standing supplier of one of its most critical inputs – nitrate of soda – used Du Pont’s position of 
dependency to demand a change of contract on very short notice. The supplier requested deposit 
of collateral, which had not been a part of the prior arrangement. After the request was granted, 
the supplier made additional demands, insisting on obtaining exclusivity of all Du Pont’s 
transactions and imposing additional requirements about the deposit of collateral. Chandler 
interprets the supplier’s demands – described by Pierre Du Pont as “obnoxious” – as a 
manifestation of strong-form self-interest.
39
 The supplier used exogenous circumstances – a 
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severe financial crisis – and the business partner’s resulting high asymmetrical dependence on the 
supplied product to renege on prior commitments in order to achieve financial gain.  
Benevolent preference reversal 
Reprioritization. This BRel dimension means delaying a commitment to a course of action in 
favour of pursuing other opportunities, which may offer a higher – or more immediate – probable 
payoff.  Such discounting of original commitments can push the decision maker to postpone the 
fulfillment of a commitment to the point where such a commitment can no longer be fulfilled.
40
 
While prior work on reprioritization has focused on instances where actors simply delay 
commitments rather than dismiss them, our analysis uncovered a different type of reprioritization, 
whereby original commitments were abandoned. We can thus distinguish between reprioritization 
leading to postponed commitments versus cancelled commitments.
41
 
One key example of reprioritization, though lacking long-term dysfunctional effects on 
the firm, can be found in Coleman Du Pont’s (cousin of Pierre Du Pont and President of the Du 
Pont company) reversal of his commitment to build a highway to run from Wilmington to 
Maryland, made initially in 1911.
42
 The proposed road was supposed to generate positive 
reputational effects for the firm and externalities, in allowing Wilmington, where the firm’s head 
office was located, to grow in parallel with the company. Coleman planned to finance the road 
construction himself, and subsequently to donate the highway to the people. The commitment 
was one in a series of political moves aimed at enhancing not only Du Pont’s but also Coleman’s 
personal reputation with external stakeholders, as at the time he had serious political ambitions as 
a member of the Republican Party. Unfortunately, the highway construction had to be suspended 
due to predictable difficulties encountered with downstate farmers who were asked to sell land 
for a right of way. For a while, Coleman focused on other priorities, thus disappointing a number 
of stakeholders.  It was not, however, an opportunistic abandonment of a promised set of actions 
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made to the city of Wilmington and the public.  In this case, the commitment was merely 
postponed, and construction resumed in 1926.  Here, the divergence from the promised pattern of 
actions was only temporary.   
 Chandler does, however, also describe situations where the revision of initial goals and 
commitments, in favour of a conflicting set, led to full abandonment of the original commitments. 
In extreme cases, decision makers may redefine (expand or simply swap) the moral circle of 
actors whose interests supposedly matter regarding a particular issue; the interests of the original 
circle thus become invalidated.
43
 Pierre Du Pont’s purchase of his cousin Coleman’s shares, 
aimed at obtaining full control of the company illustrates this form of reprioritization. 
“Pierre and his five associates conducted their negotiations with Coleman and their final 
purchase of his stock with great speed and in absolute secrecy,” meaning without informing 
Pierre’s other cousins, Alfred and William Du Pont, or the other members of the Executive 
Committee, who would certainly not have permitted the transaction had they had any knowledge 
of it.
44
 From Alfred and William’s viewpoint, the move was a breach of faith, marking the 
beginning of a conflict that eventually split the family. Considered from the perspective of 
respecting family-based corporate governance, it could be seen as an act of opportunism.
45
 
Chandler, however, offers a different angle. “If Pierre was to stay in,” – he writes, – “if he was to 
be responsible for the future of the Powder Company, he wanted the necessary authority to carry 
out this responsibility.”46 Further, Pierre Du Pont wanted to give key executives a substantial 
claim on the company’s profits, following his belief that “the success of a modern large 
corporation depended on making its executives ‘partners’ in the business by permitting them to 
consider themselves owners as well as managers”47 – a move that, in Pierre Du Pont’s view, 
would only be possible through his purchase of Coleman’s stock. We have, therefore, a situation 
whereby conflicting goals prompted reprioritization that could be considered opportunistic in 
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relation to some goals, but well intended in relation to other ones. Chandler himself suggests the 
lack of malevolence. Pierre Du Pont felt that “he had to choose between the needs of the 
enterprise and the continuance of family solidarity.”48 Remaining true to his vision of the 
company, he knowingly reneged on his prior commitment to preserving harmony among family 
clans.  He traded off his commitment to Alfred and William for a commitment that he deemed 
more important – the commitment to “the future of the Powder Company.”49 The moral circle of 
the family was traded for an expanded moral circle of those affected by the future of the 
corporation, deemed a more important priority. Pierre Du Pont was therefore unreliable in terms 
of his efforts to make good on his commitment towards family members that he would respect 
and strengthen family-based governance.  
Overcommitment. This BRel dimension refers to instances of ex-ante selection of too many 
commitments that have to be scaled back ex-post.
50
 This phenomenon accounts for a considerable 
portion of non-fulfillment of promises in Chandler’s narrative. One example can be found in the 
way GM was managed prior to Pierre Du Pont becoming involved with the company in 1915. 
GM’s founder and President, William C. Durant, ran the company in a “fast-moving, free-
wheeling manner,” without much financial or administrative control.51 Durant insisted on being 
personally involved in all intricacies of the company’s operations and systematically 
overestimated his ability to single-handedly control the complex corporation, without much 
method or system, without an adequate decision-making body and without active involvement of 
the Board.  Here, Durant’s pattern of actions can be seen as an uncodified managerial practice 
adopted in the organization. As a result, the company ended up in a financial crisis and was 
unable to meet its obligations to shareholders.  Some of the problem is clearly related to bounded 
rationality (i.e. the natural limits of Durant’s knowledge on various functional aspects of the 
business), but the President’s systemic overconfidence in his ability to manage the corporation in 
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the absence of proper governance support and without much reliance on specialized expertise in 
functional areas was at the heart of the issue. 
GM’s Executive Committee’s decision to cancel a copper-cooled engine program in 1922 
is another illustration of overcommitment.
52
 Substantial resources and time had been committed 
to developing this important innovation. Pierre Du Pont, who was inspired by the innovation and 
foresaw a great future for it in the automobile industry, actively pushed producing the new engine.  
However, he overestimated the company’s ability to develop, test and refine the engine in time to 
meet production deadlines. Part of the problem is again related to bounded rationality, but the 
overcommitment was further fuelled by clearly unrealistic promises of R&D and production 
managers, who were unable to meet their respective schedules. In the end, the combination of 
overcommitment at different levels in the organization led to the engine’s market failure: the 
newly engineered engine performed poorly, and the market’s reception of copper-cooled cars was 
unfavourable. The Executive Committee decided to refocus on an expansion program for 
Chevrolet instead of the further development of the copper-cooled engine, to the great 
disappointment of Pierre Du Pont and Charles Kettering, GM’s engineer in charge of R&D. 
Kettering attributed this preference reversal to “an organized resistance within the 
Corporation.”53 However, our reading of the case suggests that it was management’s 
overestimation of the company’s ability to produce the innovation in the set timeframe that 
drove the reversal.   
Identity-based discordance 
This category of BRel refers to commitment non-fulfillment due to conflict between ‘what one 
promises’ (in good faith) and ‘what one represents’ or ‘values’ in terms of one’s identity. More 
specifically, economic actors commit to a course of action in good faith, yet deviate from this 
agreed-upon course in a way that manifests itself over time. Unlike the case of benevolent 
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preference reversal, neither a shift in timing of delivering on the commitment takes place, nor an 
adjustment of the commitment itself. Rather, the conflict between promise and identity becomes 
apparent over time and leads to some disconnect between the promised actions and the realized, 
identity-driven actions, resulting in a breach of contract or unfulfilled promises. We observed two 
types of identity-based discordance: 1) internal psychological conflict, whereby individual actors 
identify with processes, routines and strategies – often vestiges of a successful past – that 
contradict stated or assumed commitments towards leaving behind this past; and 2) inter-group 
conflict, whereby individuals operating in particular units (either inside the firm or being 
associated with external contracting parties), identify with and pursue appropriate ‘local’ goals 
that are misaligned or conflict with those of others, in a way that ultimately diminishes achieving 
‘global’ (firm-level) goals. Based on the above observations, we identified two facets of identity-
based discordance: regression and divided engagement. 
Regression. This phenomenon is associated with organizational change, and refers to abandoning 
agreed upon commitments due to a cognitive ambivalence to change, and the persistent 
attachment, good-faith but also dysfunctional, to existing (pre-change) practices.
54
 Classic 
organizational research on identity and change suggests that individuals’ perceptions of “who 
they are and what they stand for” are a strong factor in their commitment (or lack thereof) to 
organizational action.
55
  
Chandler’s narrative addresses the making of the modern corporation with a focus on two 
processes of massive change. First, the metamorphosis of the Du Pont company – from a family 
partnership to a professionally managed firm, and then from a U-form to an M-form corporation. 
Second, the transformation of GM from a disjointed, loosely run company, to one of the largest 
and most successful enterprises of its era. In the course of these transformations, tensions often 
arose and commitment failures occurred due to people’s regression to pre-change practices, 
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which is important to distinguish from a strong form of self-interest. Mintzberg, for example, 
cautions against confusing barriers to organizational learning with opportunism by identifying 
four different psychological sources of resistance to a new strategy: narrow-mindedness (extreme 
attachment to traditional ways), small-mindedness (lack of understanding of the new strategy), 
bloody-mindedness (general unwillingness to comply) and right-mindedness (desire to serve the 
organization in the best possible way).
56
 If we were to reinterpret Mintzberg’s classification in 
our micro-foundational terms, small-mindedness would likely represent an expression of 
bounded rationality, bloody-mindedness could be akin to opportunism, while narrow-mindedness 
and right-mindedness could be seen as expressions of regression, referred to below as narrow-
minded and right-minded regression.   
These two forms of regression are typically labeled as ‘resistance to change’ in the 
psychology and organizational behaviour literature.
57
 First, narrow-minded regression could be 
described as genuine difficulties in unlearning.
58
 Extant research has identified a number of 
psychological antecedents of this form of regression, including routine seeking, emotional 
response to imposed change, cognitive rigidity, and short-term focus.
59
 In our case, regression 
mainly appeared as the inability to unlearn managerial practices that prevailed in the pre-change 
era, because of the mere, identity-related “force of old habit.”60  Consider the following examples: 
“The extent that this is now done on the part of [Harry Haskell and Hamilton Barksdale – 
Du Pont’s senior executives], it is not with intent but from force of old habit, and it will be some 
time before the two of them get straightened out,”61 – wrote Arthur Moxham  (member of the 
Executive Committee) to Coleman Du Pont (then President) in 1903 of difficulties experienced in 
implementing a new organizational structure, according to which senior executives were to keep 
their attention on broad overall policy and leave operational details to department heads. Haskell 
and Barksdale, both members of Du Pont’s Executive Committee, professed to comply with the 
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new arrangement, but in reality could not abandon their old ways, continuing to attend to minute 
matters in their departments and failing to focus on more important duties. No self-interest was 
pursued through these actions: they simply appeared unable to unlearn their old behaviour. Their 
outdated knowledge and dysfunctional attachment to related managerial practices prevented them 
from obtaining new knowledge and discarding outdated routines.
62
 This case represented more 
than just a bounded rationality challenge. Formal acceptance of the new managerial practices 
reflected acknowledgement of their value, yet, over time, commitment to implementing the new 
practices remained weak and punctured by strong identification with – and regression to – the 
‘old ways’.   
During the 1911-1914 reorganization, Coleman and Pierre Du Pont attempted to separate 
explicitly long-range policy making from routine administration.
63
 The objective was to train a 
new generation of leaders and to allow young executives to rise into key operational jobs while 
limiting the Executive Committee’s role in operational decision-making. Yet, the Executive 
Committee members found it hard to remove themselves from their former roles. They continued 
to micromanage operations and interfere with succession planning by preventing the new 
generation of executives from acquiring general management skills.  After three years of 
unsuccessful struggles to implement the new policy, it became apparent that “the solution lay in a 
change of men rather than of organization,” as “the traditions that had been established for years 
were so strong that simply drawing an organization chart could not change the company’s 
administration.”64 The company’s succession planning efforts, as well as the smooth functioning 
of governance mechanisms, suffered as a result of the Executive Committee members’ regression 
to the old order and inability to embrace their new roles. 
The 1911-1914 reorganization ended with the “change of men” that allowed Pierre Du 
Pont to move forward with the desired change of structure and related effective adoption of 
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managerial practices.
65
 Only by replacing key internal stakeholders with new ones was the 
organization able to unlearn. A similar scenario unfolded in a restructuring of GM, when Durant 
had to resign in order for the reorganization to take place under Pierre Du Pont’s guidance.66 
Interestingly, Pierre Du Pont’s own reaction to the deep economic and political changes of the 
1930s can be seen as a form of narrow-minded regression and consequent self-initiated change of 
men.
67
 Unable to grasp the meaning of the external changes he was facing, and to exercise 
requisite entrepreneurial judgment, Pierre Du Pont responded by removing himself from the 
business world.   
Second, right-minded regression reflects the genuine belief that the old ways were better. 
In these instances, stated commitments to new goals, courses of action and resource allocation 
can best be described as ceremonial: actors strongly identify with the previous order and resist 
implementation, albeit without malevolent intent. We see such resistance as being of a good-faith 
nature because it is “motivated by individuals’… desire to protect the organization’s best 
interests.”68 Psychologically, it stems from cognitive ambivalence: individuals’ (genuine) beliefs 
about proposed change as unnecessary, unimportant or inferior, trigger their regressive 
behaviour.
69
 It is distinct from bounded rationality, as the proposed new routines can be assumed 
fully understood and rationally compared with pre-change routines. 
Right-minded regression is most evident in Alfred Du Pont’s, one of the company’s 
executives prior to the 1914 reorganization, reaction to the proposal by Coleman and Pierre Du 
Pont: “... [the company] during its existence, thrived under the old plan of organization to a 
remarkable extent; and ... this success has been due largely to past methods, and not in spite of 
them.”70 This lack of acceptance of new managerial practices led to a bitter family fight, a lawsuit 
and Alfred Du Pont’s eventual departure from the company. 
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Divided engagement. This phenomenon represents a multi-actor performance achievement 
barrier, whereby various actors in the organization adopt conflicting practices, due largely to poor 
coordination of goals, incentives and routines (e.g., those prevailing in different functional areas). 
Goals, incentives and routines typically act as encoders of identities at various levels, i.e. a group 
level, department/division level, or corporate/firm level.
71
 When actors’ identify with group-level 
goals rather than firm-level ones,
72
 they may start working against each other, thus undermining 
the organizational goals to which they have de-facto committed themselves. Observing other 
actors engaging in what is wrongly perceived as sabotage, i.e., behaviour intended to adversely 
affect one’s own performance, may in itself constitute a bounded rationality problem, but the 
significant point is that it can lead to a vicious cycle of increasingly dysfunctional ‘group think’ 
and related ‘counter-actions.’ Here, all actors involved may still perceive that they are pursuing 
firm-level goals, but the discordance at hand is that the means adopted to achieve these goals now 
include dismissing, discrediting or even displacing other actors’ routines, rather than attempting 
to coordinate better with these other practices. Divided engagement occurs especially in the 
presence of different sets of routines adopted by two or more units, which come into conflict with 
each other over time, even though each routine is meant to serve overall, firm-level goals. Our 
analysis brought to light several instances of divided engagement, with non-fulfillment of 
commitment by different parties due to these parties’ adherence to divergent managerial practices. 
This was not an expression of opportunism, since all parties had committed to serving the 
corporation’s best interests, but the managerial practices of these parties were not properly 
aligned to serve the firm’s overall interests. 
One example is the divided engagement of two Powder Company departments – 
Purchasing and Inventory – during the financial panic of the early 1900s.73 A study of the 
company’s inventory demonstrated that Du Pont’s Purchasing Department’s spending was 
 22 
undermining the company’s short-term financial requirements. The head of the Purchasing 
Department attempted to capitalize on favourable prices for essential materials during the time of 
the crisis, which resulted in a large increase in required working capital at the exact time when 
consumption was dropping, leading to excessive inventories in the Essential Materials 
Department. The latter Department was aiming to reduce inventory costs, while the Purchasing 
Department’s goal was to reduce the long-term cost of supplies. Conventional management 
theory would explain this issue by alleged opportunistic sub-goal pursuit by the two managers in 
order to advance their respective functional departments’ interests.  However, both managers 
appeared to believe to be acting in the best financial interest of the firm. Pierre Du Pont, who at 
the time was the company’s treasurer and thus possessed the best knowledge of the firm’s 
financial requirements, had to act as arbitrator between the conflicting routines, and initiated a 
comprehensive review of the issue in an effort to simultaneously achieve the advantages of large-
scale, long-term buying and minimum inventories. This review eventually led to Pierre Du Pont’s 
judgment that the firm should integrate vertically. When viewed through a BRel lens, the point of 
this incident is that both departments failed to help the company achieve its financial goals, 
mainly because their respective routines led them to engage in ‘divided,’ rather than harmonized 
behaviour. 
This problem was particularly significant at GM, where divisions traditionally operated 
independently and with very little cooperation and coordination (the problem eventually 
remedied by creating interdivisional committees). The discordance resulted in redundancies in 
product lines, operational difficulties, frequent conflicts between “line and staff men” and, 
ultimately, non-achievement of financial goals.
74
  
The intra-company material transfers at Du Pont in 1904 represent another example of 
diverging divisional routines resulting in divided engagement.
75
 At the time, Pierre Du Pont was 
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establishing new costing and pricing policies, stipulating that interdepartmental billing should be 
based on costs rather than market prices. If intra-company costs were higher than external market 
prices, the buying units ended up penalized by having to purchase supplies at greater expense. As 
the company integrated vertically, it began to control a larger portion of its supplies, and 
interdepartmental transfers became more common.  Pierre Du Pont insisted on charging at cost 
within the company in order to adhere to proper accounting procedures; consequently, while 
accounting achieved streamlined processes, other departments suffered losses. In addition, the 
performance of individual departments could not be easily assessed under the cost system, as it 
was not immediately apparent which selling units’ costs were too high to match current, external 
market prices. As a result, targets were missed due to inappropriate handling of interdepartmental 
transfers. Much later, during his tenure at GM, Pierre Du Pont accepted market-based intra-
company billing, whereby interdepartmental prices were set through negotiations. This practice, 
reflecting internal markets, has been identified in the management literature as one of the main 
coordinating mechanisms in multidivisional firms.
76
  
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN MANAGEMENT PRACTICE: IMPLEMENTING 
SAFEGUARDS 
Our analysis proposes three distinct faces of BRel, namely opportunism, benevolent preference 
reversal and identity-based discordance, that result in commitment failure and typically, negative 
consequences for the firm. 
The BRel concept builds on the observation that individuals – even when acting in good 
faith – often fail to make good on their commitments.  Such good-faith failures appear 
responsible for the bulk of unfulfilled commitments in and around firms.  BRel recognizes the 
presence of opportunism, but offers additional considerations as to when and why non-fulfillment 
of commitment is likely to occur, and how it can be mitigated.  
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Understanding the nature of failed commitments resulting from good-faith actions is 
important for managerial practice, particularly in the context of preventing commitment breaches 
in real-life organizational settings. In this section of the paper, we discuss safeguarding tools 
described by Chandler, and assess their relevance for modern management practice.  Each BRel 
dimension is tied to specific strategies aimed at reducing its occurrence and its negative impacts, 
as summarized in Table I. Safeguarding against opportunism and benevolent preference reversal 
is relatively well researched and understood,
77
 but this is less the case for economizing on 
identity-based discordance. Hence, we will briefly note the economizing strategies for the former 
BRel facets, but will then focus mainly on safeguarding against regression and divided 
engagement – the two dimensions of identity-based discordance – representing the third face of 
BRel identified in this study.  
INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE 
Safeguarding tools against opportunism and benevolent preference reversal  
In general terms, our reading of Chandler confirmed that:  
1) Opportunism can be addressed through the rise of sophisticated contractual safeguards, 
both inside the firm and in the firm’s interactions with outside actors;  
2) Reprioritizing and the related bounds on reliability vis-à-vis those to whom promises were 
made, can be addressed through routines that pertain to joint planning and structured 
communication involving all actors instrumental to making good on the commitment at 
hand. In addition, we found that some forms of reprioritization must be addressed by 
meshing conflicting commitments before conflict actually materializes, which can be 
achieved through entrepreneurial diplomacy, negotiations and arbitration; 
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3) Routines that keep in check individuals’ impulsivity and their self-assessment bias, can 
help avoid the occurrence of overcommitment, and the subsequent need to scale back on it.  
Safeguarding tools for identity-based discordance  
Regression. For BRel associated with regression, safeguarding strategies include support for 
participating parties to unlearn pre-existing, dysfunctional organizational practices. In the context 
of Du Pont and GM, this was achieved through entrepreneurial activities that included personal 
leadership, mentorship, relationship building and communication. This approach aimed at 
motivating people to identify with new routines, educating them on how the altered routines are 
superior, and managing their impressions of change so as to link individuals’ perceptions of self 
to their perceptions of proposed actions, in a positive way.
78
  Attempting to eliminate regression 
manifested itself, in Du Pont’s case, in “care and diplomacy in making changes.”79 One key 
example of such safeguarding mechanism can be seen in Pierre Du Pont’s efforts to revitalize 
GM when he took over from Durant as the company’s President.80 Pierre Du Pont worked 
diligently to win the confidence of managers who had worked for Durant with respect and 
affection, and to restore employees’ faith in the company’s future. He visited plants, had face-to-
face meetings with managers and made a point of personally meeting local businessmen and civic 
leaders in towns where GM plants and offices were located. By doing this, Pierre Du Pont 
reassured GM staff, executives, suppliers and broader stakeholders that the company would 
remain solvent and become prosperous again, and that the new management was competent, 
concerned about employees’ well being and willing to learn – that is, he engaged in active 
‘impression management’ to inspire positive commitment and action.81  In extreme cases, 
however, a ‘change of men’ was required. Those who were unable to identify with the new 
practices either withdrew or were forced to withdraw from the company.  
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One of Chandler’s concluding remarks about Pierre Du Pont underscores the importance 
of safeguarding against regression: “In business matters he never favoured maintaining the status 
quo.  His achievements resulted from an accommodation, not a resistance, to change.”82 For 
Pierre Du Pont, helping others identify with change (thereby safeguarding against regression) 
became an enabler for creating two of the most successful corporations of his time.  
Today, managers have additional powerful safeguards against regression at their disposal. 
Formal training is commonly deployed to curb regression.
83
 Further, information technology (IT) 
is seen as a change enabler due to its capacity to aid in collecting, analyzing and sharing relevant 
information.
84
 Yet, two qualifying points should be made here. First, both scholarly and practice-
based evidence shows that successful IT-enabled change requires a balance between hard 
(structural and technological) and soft (organizational and social) factors
85
 – that is to say, ‘soft’ 
safeguards against regression, as practiced by Pierre Du Pont, have not lost their relevance in an 
era of IT-enabled safeguards. Second, dismissal may sometimes be unavoidable, especially in 
instances when a quick response to change is a strategic imperative.
86
  
Divided engagement. Divided engagement among divisional or departmental actors can be 
safeguarded against by creating a clear, firm-level identity, encoded in overall objectives and 
routines, that cascades into organizational units, with subsequent encoding in compatible unit-
level objectives and routine. Implementing such an ‘identity cascade’, however, is easier said 
than done.
87
  Du Pont employed formal and informal coordination mechanisms to mesh 
individuals’ firm-level and unit-level identities and activities. Formal mechanisms include the 
programming active head office involvement, structural coordination bodies, and planning and 
control.  Du Pont and GM adopted such mechanisms in the form of comprehensive reviews, 
interdivisional committees and internal markets.  Interdivisional committees proved particularly 
effective at GM, where misperceived and uncoordinated differences among divisional routines 
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and goals resulted in a dysfunctional discordance. The first interdivisional committee, called a 
‘General Technical Committee’, was struck to bridge the gap between engineering and product 
development as a response to the copper-cooled engine fiasco.
88
 The General Technical 
Committee proved successful, and the company followed by setting up similar General Sales, 
Works Managers and Power and Maintenance committees in 1924. These permanent 
interdivisional committees with their own staff and funds strengthened the corporation 
considerably by harmonizing the interests and activities of individuals operating in different 
departments without impairing their autonomy.  
Informal, or person-oriented mechanisms include socialization and targeted development 
of a common corporate culture, which, in Chandler’s case, were exemplified by arbitration and 
relationship building through personal contacts.   
While centralization of decision-making may not always be desirable or achievable in 
today’s business environment, a common theme apparent in the above discussion of safeguards is 
the use of social coordination methods such as communication and relationship building. 
Interpersonal dynamics appear as relevant as ever to the functioning of a modern corporation; this 
further underscores the need for realistic micro-foundations to understand fully what is required 
to achieve managerial success.  
It is also worth noting that while divided engagement is a dimension of identity-based 
discordance, it could also call managerial attention to firm-level goals and routines, and signal the 
need for structural change – in the same way as the conflict between Du Pont’s Purchasing and 
Inventory departments in the early 1900s led to vertical integration.
89
 Today’s managers should 
take manifestations of divided engagement as an opportunity to review both inter-level 
consistency of goals and routines, and the overall appropriateness and strategic soundness of 
firm-level objectives, processes and even organizational restructuring. 
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To conclude our discussion of managerial safeguards, we should note that the broad 
spectrum of safeguards addressing the various challenges posed by good faith preference reversal 
and identity-based discordance will often also curb opportunism.
90
  In contrast, the limited 
arsenal of safeguards against opportunism such as special contractual clauses, incentive 
alignment and monitoring, is entirely insufficient to prevent or mitigate the effects of ‘good-faith’ 
expressions of BRel.  For example, socialization can safeguard against opportunism even if 
deployed with the purpose of regression management, yet incentive alignment deployed to curb 
opportunism cannot replace socialization to safeguard against regression. The critical point for 
managers is therefore that trying to safeguard against opportunism alone, without considering 
safeguards to manage good-faith preference reversals and identity-based discordance, will lead 
them to miss a wide range of sources of commitment failure, as well as the instruments to prevent 
or remediate such failures.  
VALUE OF BREL IN VARIOUS SITUATIONAL CONTEXTS: CURRENT 
IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECITONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Properly managing BRel is particularly relevant to any firm operating in a complex 
organizational, technological or environmental setting, where the circle of those affected by a 
particular decision or commitment is diverse and expandable. Consider the realm of family 
business.  In Chandler’s words, “the most critical period in the history of any modern large 
impersonal corporation comes when the founder or his family have to make terms with the 
requirements of large-scale enterprise.”91 The potential conflict between the needs of the family 
and those of the business may create two clans within the firm with distinct identities, opening 
the door for both reprioritization and divided engagement: for example, non-economic objectives 
of family members can lead them to subvert commitments made to the firm and its professional 
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managers.
92
 Pierre Du Pont was acutely aware of this conflict between kinship and business and 
in most cases (except when buying Coleman’s Du Pont stock without informing the other cousins 
Alfred and William) worked to mitigate it – mostly by means of negotiations, arbitration, 
sensitivity “to other people’s feelings” and “care and diplomacy in making changes”; he thereby 
mitigated the unreliability of others and avoided becoming unreliable himself.
93
  
Multinational enterprises face ‘multiple embeddedness’ associated with home versus host 
countries, which creates a fertile ground for divided engagement.
94
 One example is that of 
managerial practices prevailing in the host environment, e.g., in the realm of corruption that may 
be ‘expected’ in this environment so as to boost short-term sales, but that will also subvert agreed 
upon routines prevailing in the home country and even in the entire subsidiary network, thereby 
endangering the firm’s reputation.95  
The management of regression is relevant to any organization facing drastic change in the 
face of environmental turbulence.  Today, firms face employees’ regression in response to 
mergers and acquisitions, business function outsourcing or offshoring, process reengineering, 
decentralization, restructuring, divestment, change of leadership and/or ownership and 
introduction of new strategic initiatives, to name but a few common situations requiring 
employees to embrace change. Regression as a situational facet of BRel offers new ways of 
conceptualizing resistance to change, while removing the conventional negative connotation 
associated with ‘resistance’ and suggesting a variety of mechanisms relevant to managerial 
practice. In other words, resistance to change, even when the need for such change has been 
agreed upon, should not be considered as an expression of opportunism, but may require the 
deployment of substantial resources for purposes of communication and training. Even if the 
actors involved in regression appear unable to change and need to be removed from the 
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organization, this identity-based dysfunction and the inability to unlearn should not be equated 
with strong-form self-interest. 
The three faces of BRel we identified in the context of two multidivisional corporations, 
are likely valid beyond the confines of a traditional Chandlerian hierarchy, and can be 
investigated in any other governance form, including the broad spectrum of contractual 
arrangements with outside parties.  Future research should examine the applicability of identity-
based discordance in an inter-firm setting, particularly in situations characterized by contracting 
with a broad spectrum of actors with diverging priorities and identities, e.g., outsourcing 
relationships, network governance, stakeholder management, management of a geographically 
dispersed value chain, etc. 
CONCLUSION 
Our study makes two key contributions.  First, we provide a substantive rationale for 
adopting bounded reliability or BRel as a micro-foundation in strategic and general management 
theory, and we identify three distinct ‘faces’ (each having two dimensions) of this new concept. 
BRel represents a major improvement over the often-used opportunism assumption and the 
limited arsenal of tools supposed to suppress it or to remediate its negative impacts. Adopting 
BRel as a general micro-foundation in management studies can reverse the ‘ideology-based 
gloomy vision’ that individuals are systematically driven by strong-form self-interest. 
Importantly, by showing that many failures to fulfill commitments in business do not actually 
result from strong-form self-interest, we provide a new path to ‘fix’ the bad management theories 
that have made this wrong assumption and that have destroyed good management practices.
96
 
When viewed through a BRel lens, commitment non-fulfillment need not be malevolent. Our 
paper establishes the foundation for theorizing on BRel, but it also has far-reaching implications 
for managerial practice. Managers in any firm should systematically craft a three-pronged 
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approach – i.e., a ‘Cerberus project’ – to prevent the occurrence and mitigate the negative 
impacts of each of the three distinct BRel faces.
97
   
Our second contribution is that we engaged in a “transdisciplinary” research project, 
whereby we revisited and reinterpreted for today’s managers one of the most elaborate and 
credible business history cases ever written.
98
 The past few decades have been characterized as a 
‘historic turn’ in management studies, with both historians and managers advocating the 
relevance of a historical perspective.
99
 In this context, our study shows that insight from high 
quality historical accounts of how managers addressed critical, real-world challenges in the past 
can provide effective solutions to almost identical challenges in today’s business world. 
The present study is not without limitations. It has focused on one – albeit rich and 
abundant – source of historical data, in one particular organizational context. Here, the three faces 
of BRel were identified in the context of two, large multidivisional firms. While we have 
suggested that the three faces of BRel may stretch far beyond the boundaries of the enterprise as a 
stand-alone operation, future work needs to examine further the various expressions of BRel and 
their interrelationships in a variety of contexts, ranging from family firms to large MNEs and 
hybrid organizations, across industries and stages of organizational development. Here, new 
dimensions of BRel could potentially be uncovered, possibly through further transdisciplinary 
research.   
Further development of this envelope concept is needed to firmly embed BRel as a 
standard micro-foundation in management research and practice, in addition – but equal in 
importance – to the now widely accepted bounded rationality concept. In the present article, we 
have mined Chandler’s work to identify the main sources of BRel; we have revisited Chandler’s 
neglected masterpiece and demonstrated that it still serves as a powerful source of evidence for 
building and refining management theory. Careful reading of the Du Pont masterpiece indeed 
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credibly shows that aligning strategy and structure resulted mainly from sustained entrepreneurial 
(and subsequently routinized) efforts at reducing the occurrence and negative impacts of the 
various BRel facets. Du Pont’s and GM’s successful transformation into professionally managed, 
Chandlerian hierarchies would not have been achieved by a sole focus on reducing bounded 
rationality problems and by simply assuming the inevitability of human opportunism. 
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Figure 1. The Three Faces of Bounded Reliability (BRel)  
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Table I. Safeguarding against the six dimensions of bounded reliability (BRel)  
BRel categories Safeguarding mechanisms Specific examples of safeguards 
Opportunism 
Ex-ante  Contractual safeguards 
 Incentive alignment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Monitoring 
 Price hedging in supplier contracts 
 Building mutually beneficial clauses 
into contracts with partners, e.g. 
nominal payments between the Du 
Pont and the Anglo-German group 
of companies for the use of 
European versus American 
processes and methods in order to 
keep parties satisfied with division 
of world markets 
 Review of accounts for 
irregularities; personal visits abroad 
to monitor supplier/partner contracts 
Ex-post  Legal action 
 
 Discontinuation of 
relationship 
 Mitigating effects of opportunism by 
outside parties through courts 
 Termination clauses in contracts; 
employee dismissal 
Benevolent 
preference 
reversal 
Reprioriti-
zation 
 Organizational routines 
to reduce cognitive 
distance 
 Reduction of potential 
friction among multiple 
realities 
 Structured communication on 
important issues, joint (long-range) 
planning 
 Diplomacy, negotiation and 
arbitration 
Over- 
commitment 
 Organizational routines 
to reduce impulsivity and 
self-assessment bias 
 Imposing limits on new activities; 
realistic goal setting; utilizing 
specialized expertise in goal setting; 
joint goal setting; structured 
governance practices 
Identity-based 
discordance 
Regression  Organizational routines 
to help unlearn old 
practices 
 Impression management 
 Discontinuation of 
relationship 
 Leadership to explain superiority of 
new routines, training to adopt new 
routines 
 Communication/information sharing 
 “Change of men” (dismissal) 
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Divided 
engagement 
 Informal coordination 
mechanisms 
 Formal coordination 
 
 
 
 
 Development of common 
identity and culture 
 Arbitration and communication 
 
 Centralization of decision-making 
active head office involvement; 
internal markets; comprehensive 
reviews; interdivisional committees / 
task forces 
 Socialization through fostering 
personal contacts, joint top-level 
planning, visibility of top 
management 
 
 
